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THE PROBLEM OF STATUTORY DETAIL IN NATIONAL
PARK ESTABLISHMENT LEGISLATION AND ITS

RELATIONSHIP TO POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN*

INTRODUCTION

Legal scholarship examining national park management focuses almost
exclusively on the so-called "Organic Act" describing the overarching mandate
for the National Park Service ("NPS" or "Service"). Title 16 of the United
States Code prominently proclaims in its first section the famous kernel of this
1916 law, significantly clarified in 1978, that the purpose of national parks,
monuments, and reservations is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.'
This visionary mandate is what most commentators home in on when they
discuss national park management. 2 Certainly, it is what Wallace Stegner had
in mind when he referred to the national parks as "the best idea we ever
had."3
But the bright fame of this broad statement of purpose has blinded many
scholars to several hundred sections that follow it in Title 16. These are the

* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. A.B., 1984,
Princeton University; M.S., J.D., University of Michigan, 1987. I thank my colleagues who offered wide-ranging insights on my ideas at an Indiana University School of Law colloquium. Fred
Cate offered particularly constructive comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Professor Jan
Laitos for inviting me to present my work in this symposium. Students Peter Dykstra, Thomas Ice,
and Christian Freitag provided able research assistance. I received generous support through an
Indiana University School of Law Summer Faculty Fellowship.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) [hereinafter Organic Act].
2. See, e.g., Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and
Scale of Development in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3, 4 (1992); Robert B. Keiter,
National Park Protection: Putting the OrganicAct to Work, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING
TE NATIONAL PARKS 75 (David J. Simon ed., 1988); John Lemons & Dean Stout, A Reinterpretation of National Park Legislation, 15 ENvTL. L. 41, 42 (1984); William Andrew Shutkin, Note,
The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 345, 361 (1991); see also Clayton L.
Riddle, Comment, Protecting the Grand Canyon National Park from Glen Canyon Dam: Environmental Law at Its Worst, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 115, 126-29 (1993) (describing constraints on NPS
power to protect parklands).
3. William J. Lockhart, External Park Threats and Interior'sLimits: The Need for an Independent National Park Service, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 3, 3
(David J. Simon ed., 1988) (quoting Wallace Stegner, The Best Idea We Ever Had, 46 WILDERNESS 4 (1983)).
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sections that establish to which lands the overarching mandate will apply and,
increasingly in recent years, detail how the Organic Act will apply to the specifically reserved units managed by the Service. The Organic Act would be
nothing more than a distant vision, with no on-the-ground application, were it
not for the establishment statutes that have created 54 national parks, 73 national monuments,
and a variety of other reservations in the 374-unit national
4
park system.
There are good reasons why the literature on national park management
focuses on the Organic Act. Certainly, the overarching mandate is one of the
most important statements of American cultural values enacted as environmental law. Also, it is the fundamental interpretive rule in exercising and reviewing the proprietary management discretion of the Service. The Organic Act,
unlike establishment legislation, applies comprehensively to the entire geographic sweep of the national park system.5 Finally, the Organic Act sets up
an elegant tension between providing for enjoyment (often interpreted as recreation) and leaving units unimpaired (often interpreted as preservation). This
tension has stoked the furnace of countless heated arguments over management direction for the Service.6
Unfortunately, this deserved interest in the NPS organic legislation has
almost completely eclipsed searching analysis of establishment legislation.
This Article is an initial step toward addressing the importance of establishment- legislation. Although examination of establishment legislation cannot
substitute for application of the Organic Act, it is critical to understanding the
changing role of Congress in the actual management of the national park
system and important trends in environmental law. The first Section of this
Article outlines the importance of establishment legislation to legal scholarship. Section Two describes the general trend in environmental law for Congress, through greater statutory detail, to assume an ever larger role in specifying how agencies should implement delegated programs. This Section also

4. List of Units in the National Park System (visited Nov. 10, 1996)
<http://www.nps.gov/legacy/npslist.html> [hereinafter List]. All of the reserved lands managed by
the Service, not just designated "national parks," are part of the national park system. 16 U.S.C. §
lc(a) (1994). All national park system units are subject to the same organic legislation to the extent that it does not conflict with provisions specifically applicable to them. Id. § lc(b)7. Specifically applicable provisions generally appear in establishment legislation.
5. 16 U.S.C. § lc(b). Units of the park system range.from the modest, such as Fort Stanwix
National Monument, New York, to the vast, such as Wrangell-St. Elias National Park, Alaska.
List, supra note 4. Delaware is the only state unrepresented in the over 80 million acres of the
national park system. Id.
6. Compare Herman, supra note 2 (arguing for narrow Service discretion in balancing competing interests), with Douglas 0. Linder, New Directionfor Pre~ervationLaw: Creating an Environment Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 49 (1990) (arguing for a new balancing approach
emphasizing the human experience), and Riddle, supra note 2 (arguing for legislative restructuring
of park management), and Robin Winks, Dispelling the Myth, NAT'L PARKS, July/Aug. 1996, at
52 (arguing that the tension is contrived because unimpairment concerns supersede all else). See
generally, George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks from
External Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 15-27 (1987) (proposing legislative changes and
approaches to reduce external threats); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing
a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. CoLO. L. RaV. 293, 296-312 (1994) (discussing the
current state of ecosystem management under the Organic Act).
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reviews the trend as it has appeared in pollution control legislation and describes the parallel trend in establishment legislation, highlighting similarities
and differences. Section Three explores the reasons for the growth in statutory
detail in environmental law, and establishment legislation in particular. In both
the pollution control and national park context, specific congressional management mandates become more prevalent in legislation addressing second-generation problems. Second-generation problems are those that remain after Congress and agencies address the relatively low-cost, easy issues in a field. Section Four discusses the effects of the growth of statutory detail on the NPS.
On balance, this growth frustrates the objective of systemic management of
national park units. Section Five outlines a course of reform to facilitate systemic management.
SECTION I: LEARNING FROM NPS ESTABLISHMENT LEGISLATION

There are two reasons why scholars should turn their attention to 'NPS
establishment legislation. First, from a purely descriptive point of view, establishment legislation indicates the changing attitude of Congress toward parks.
Establishment legislation is an increasingly important but almost uniformly
overlooked source of objectives for management of the national park system.
One simply cannot understand the priorities and decisions that guide planning
for the national park system without reviewing establishment legislation. Second, as a classic example of the proprietary strand of environmental law,7 establishment legislation provides an instructive contrast with pollution control
law. Existing literature describing the reasons for and the effects of statutory
detail in pollution control law provides a benchmark for evaluating the role of
Congress in the management of the national park system. The study of establishment legislation highlights important areas of unity in these two disparate
strands.
A. The Role of Congress in the Management of the NationalPark System
Any single statute is a snapshot of the congressional landscape at the time
of its enactment. Important legislation, such as the Organic Act, conveys a
great deal about the compromises and accommodations necessary to secure
enactment. However, because Congress seldom amends overarching legislation, these statutes have limited use as indicators of trends. Establishment
statutes, because Congress regularly enacts them, serve well as indicators of
the expanding role of congressional involvement in national park system management. Perhaps the most important trend revealed by establishment legislation over the past few decades is the expansion in the number of units composing the national park system.'
Less noted but equally important, however, is the tendency in recent de-

7. The proprietary strand of environmental law governs management of publicly owned
resources.
8. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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cades for Congress to specify in greater detail the management tasks for newly
established units of the national park system. In its simplest form, establishment legislation would specify the metes and bounds of an area to be reserved
or acquired for management by the Service under the Organic Act.9 However,
during the past twenty-five years, Congress has rarely limited its lawmaking to
simple area designation in establishment legislation. As the discussion in Section Two of this article will show, Congress increasingly tailors management
instructions to the Service for each unit established. Congress may specify
management constraints on park administration with respect to visitor activities
such as fishing, hunting, or grazing.' ° It also may set out a particular process
for planning, involving public hearings and consultations; and, it may require
the management plan itself to address certain issues."
The greater congressional attention to management detail in establishment
legislation gives rise to an increasingly important but frequently overlooked
source of law for management of the national park system. Although the Organic Act remains an important interpretive tool, Service decision-makers must
look first to establishment legislation to determine whether it speaks to an
issue that an NPS unit needs to deal with. 2 In the past decade, commentators
have increasingly called for management reform to strengthen the Service's
efforts in preservation. As the biological diversity of the United States continues to erode, for instance, the national park system becomes ever more valuable to maintain the biological integrity of representative ecosystems throughout the country. 3 An examination of establishment legislation reveals that
simple clarification of the Organic Act to stress the preservation prong of the
Service's dual mandate, or even amending the Organic Act to embrace explicitly biological diversity, would not be sufficient to achieve comprehensive
reform. Establishment legislation, which guides the management and planning
for individual parks would also need to be revisited. 4

9. The establishment legislation for Haleakala National Park illustrates this bare-bones approach. See 16 U.S.C. § 396b, c (1994).
10. The establishment legislation for Great Basin National Park for instance, discusses zoning waters for fishing and limiting grazing. See id. § 410mm-l(b), (c) (1994).
11. The establishment legislation for Channel Islands National Park, for instance, provides a
deadline for a management plan, requires consultation with certain interested parties, mandates
certain contents of the plan, requires public hearings in particular locations to discuss certain issues, specifies low-intensity and limited entry management, prohibits entry fees, and mandates
certain studies. See id. § 410ff, ff-2, ff-3, ff-6.
12. Id. § lc(b); NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGEMENT
POLICIES 2:6 (1988) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT PoLIcIEs] ("Congressionally directed plans will be
given a priority that enables their completion within the required time frame."). See, e.g., NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL GENERAL MANAGEMENT
PLAN/ENVtRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT: CARLSBAD CAVERNS

4 (1996)

[hereinafter FINAL

GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN] (recognizing establishment legislation to describe park purpose);

Todd Wilkinson, Crowd Control: With a Pilot Program at Arches National Park, the National
Park Service Is Charting a Promising New Course for Visitor Management, NAT'L PARKS, July/Aug. 1995, at 36, 39 (describing a resource management program in Arches National Park that
begins with a re-examination of the establishment legislation).
13. See Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National Park Ecosystems, and Private Property Rights, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 5, 5-8 (1993); Linder, supra note 6,
at 63-69.
14. Organic Act reform could, say, mandate restoration and preservation of biological diver-
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Furthermore, the current climate of fiscal austerity heightens the importance of establishment legislation. As federal budgets for NPS management
constrict, the Service has ever-diminishing resources to dedicate to discretionary activities. 5 Management mandates contained in establishment legislation
are always a high funding priority compared to discretionary activities; but, as
budgets become tighter, the mandates may be the only activities that the Service can afford. Even where the establishment legislation contains recommendations and not mandates, these expressions of congressional preference must
be accorded high priority. As federal budgets chop lower priority programs off
the Service's agenda, increasingly the activities actually funded will be those
mentioned in establishment legislation. These establishment activities are the
inner core of programs most protected from the fiscal ax.
Perhaps most important from a park management perspective, the trend of
increasing congressional management through establishment legislation thwarts
efforts to manage the national park system as a system rather than a mere
collection of lands. Whether to conserve representative ecosystems or create an
outdoor university for environmental and cultural appreciation, any comprehensive attempt at management of the national park system must stumble over
the scores of hurdles erected by establishment legislation provisions. To some
extent, this is precisely the design of increased congressional involvement in
NPS unit management: to impede executive branch power to change the
course of land management policy.
But, the units managed by the Service purport to be part of a national
park system. A system is a group of interrelated elements forning a collective
entity; 6 a complex unity formed of many diverse parts subject to a common
plan or'serving a common purpose; an aggregation or assemblage of objects
joined in interdependence. 7 Establishing a framework within which units can
interrelate is important not simply to fulfill the semantic promise of a national
park system. It also allows each unit to contribute to a purpose broader than
mere individual conservation of a unit's particular resources in its local context. At its outset, the national park system was infused with cultural meaning:

sity. If Congress provided that this mandate superseded all establishment legislation provisions
incompatible with achieving the biological diversity goals, it might solve the problem of amending
each establishment statute separately. This blanket solution, however, would not express congressional intent as clearly as identifying just which establishment legislation provisions should be
deemed incompatible. In any event, the existence of the establishment legislation management
provisions cannot be overlooked in any reform proposal. See infra Section IV for consideration of
a wider range of possible Organic Act reforms.
15. When the NPS celebrated its 75th anniversary, it participated in an intensive evaluation
of its performance, commonly identified by the name of the town where the park management
syumposium was held: Vail, Colorado. At the time, the results of the study were published in
1993, the core operating budget of the agency had "remained flat.in real terms since 1983" while
recreational visits to the system had risen 25 percent. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE STEERING COMMrITEE, NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE VAIL AGENDA 11 (1993) [hereinafter
THE VAIL AGENDA]. In 1994, the Service fielded one ranger for every 80,000 visitors to the system, compared with one ranger for every 59,000 visitors in 1980. Michael Milstein, NationalPark
Service Is Put on a Starvation Diet, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 16, 1994, at 3.
16. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1823 (3d ed. 1992).
17. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2322 (1986).
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monumentalism was the principle that linked park units."8 Over time, the
principle of protecting healthy functioning ecosystems emerged as an
aspirational, systemic theme. 9 However, as this theme emerged, scores of
new units were added to the system, many (such as the 112 historical parks
and sites) with no monumental scenery or ecological significance.
In recent years, many critics of the national park system have called for
paring down the number of units managed by the Service.2" However, without a clear consensus on just what is the purpose of the system, any effort to
decommission units will miss the mark. This points to the need for reform and
clarification of the Organic Act to better describe the goals of the national
park system. After that is accomplished, the critics who complain of dilution
of the mission of the Service through pork-barrel parks can look to establishment legislation for clues as to which units are the least consistent with the
broad charge of the NPS. Extensive management mandates in establishment
legislation may be an indication that a unit does not fit very well within the
existing framework of the national park system.
B. The Instructive Contrast with Pollution Control Law
The relative silence in legal scholarship on the trend toward more detailed
management mandates in establishment legislation for the NPS contrasts starkly with the widely noted trend in pollution control law of more congressional
involvement in regulatory matters. One task of this Article is to describe the
extent to which these two trends are actually manifestations of a single development in the relationship between Congress and agencies in environmental
law.2' The contrast in the literature reflects a wider gulf between the pollution
control and the natural resource management strands of environmental law.
This gulf frustrates the borrowing of insights from one strand that might apply
to the other. This Article explores the extent to which fruitful cross-fertilization may result from efforts to reweave these divergent strands of environmental law.
Beginning with the proliferation of federal statutes regulating polluting
activities in the early 1970s, environmental law commentary and practitioners
have split into two distinct branches, or strands. The first, and newest, deals
with pollution control. It is generally characterized by legislation authorized by
the Commerce Clause22 that employs agencies to regulate activities to control

18. ALFRED RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN ExPERIENcE 33-35 (2d ed. 1987).
19. See id. at 65-67; Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce, GreaterYellowstone's Future: Ecosystem Management in a Wilderness Environment, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM:
REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 379, 379-82, 402-07 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark
S. Boyce eds., 1991).
20. See 141 CONG. REC. H9085 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hansen);
JAMES M. RIDENOUR, THE NATIONAL PARKS COMPRONISED: PORK BARREL PoLITIcs AND
AMERICA'S TREASURES 16-19 (1994).

21. See infra Section m. The broader trend of increasing statutory detail outside of environmental law is undeniable but beyond the scope of this article.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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pollution. The other strand, with roots in the conservation movement of the
early twentieth century, is generally characterized by legislation authorized by
the Property Clause23 that employs agencies to act as proprietors of natural
resources. These distinctions are reflected in the organization of agencies as
well as the committee structures of Congress.
Historically, pollution control law has focused on controlling use of the
environment as a sink for environmentally undesirable substances. Natural
resources law has focused on controlling use of the environment as a source of
environmental goods. Increasingly, however, these distinctions are fading. One
reason for this merging is that, after early, relatively easy successes, each
strand now requires coordination with the other to achieve its goals. For instance, reducing water pollution in order to sustain high quality uses of a river
may require restrictions on public logging in the watershed (natural resources
law) as well as the application of best technology to dischargers along the
river (pollution control law).24 Similarly, maintaining viable populations of
wildlife essential to a national park (natural resources law) may require restrictions on air emissions (pollution control law).'
Another trend pulling together the divergent strands of environmental law
is the heightened recognition of ecological integrity (or biological diversity) as
a goal that undergirds the maintenance of environmental quality. Ecological
integrity depends upon resource use that both designates for preservation core
refuge areas and minimizes destructive impacts of commodity uses. It also
depends upon pollution control that considers effects of pollutants on wildlife
and plants as well as the more traditional human health criterion.26 Many environmental law programs, such as regulating dredge or fill activities,27 blur
the distinction in the sense that they employ the tools of one field (such as
permitting from pollution control) to zone and manage natural resources (such
as wetlands). These programs complicate the simplified model of two distinct
strands but nonetheless may be placed on a spectrum defined by the two
branches.

23.

24.

cl. 2.
Siltation is the leading cause of impairment of rivers and streams in the United States.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:

1992

REPORT TO CONGRESS 3. In its 1992 inventory, the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] attributed impairment through silviculture as the source of seven percent, and resource extraction as
the source of eleven percent, of the assessed river miles impaired by pollution. Id. at 20. In many
states, these activities are managed on federal public lands. Another example of a public land
management activity that impacts ambient environment quality is prescribed burning, which contributes to air pollution problems in many parts of the country. See, e.g., GRAND CANYON VlSIaIrLTY TRANSPORT COMMISSION, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS ii, 49-51 (April 1996 Draft for
Public Comment); JANICE PETERSON & DAROLD WARD, USDA FOREST SERVICE PACIFC NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION, AN INVENTORY OF PARTICULATE MATTER AND AIR

ToXIc

EMISSIONS

FROM PRESCRIBED FIRES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1989.

25. Atmospheric deposition of mercury interferes with the reproductive success of Florida
panthers in Everglades National Park. C. Facemire et al., Impacts of Mercury Contamination in
the Southeastern United States, 80 WATER AIR & SOIL POLLUTION 923, 925 (1995).

26. Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to
Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435, 487-88 (1992) (addressing biological resource protection through
the use of EPA authorities).
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a)-(t) (1994).
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National park legislation, however, is not such a complicated program. In
fact, it illustrates the classic natural resources law characteristics. The Service
is an agency in the Interior Department with a proprietary ethic, operating
under legislation that focuses on allowing certain uses of public resources.
Therefore, the extent to which aspects of NPS law currently are converging
with aspects of pollution control law demonstrates the strength of their fundamental affinity after twenty-five years of isolated specialization. The convergence is partly driven by issues such as the effects of polluting activities on
NPS goals (e.g., visibility of scenic wonders in the Southwest), and the effects
of NPS resource management on ambient environmental standards (e.g., winter
air quality in West Yellowstone, Montana).
This Article reveals another respect in which NPS law illustrates convergence. Establishment legislation, the day-to-day, on-the-ground guidance for
Service management, has come to resemble, more and more, pollution control
statutes in its level of detail. Congress is far more engaged today in the details
of park management in a manner similar to its increased involvement in setting pollution control standards. Certainly, some of the explanations for this
trend in national park system management are not applicable to the pollution
control context. However, many of them are. A more integrated view of environmental law aids in the understanding of both the similarities and differences.
Finally, this analysis of establishment legislation raises the normative
question of how much detail Congress ought to inscribe in statutes delegating
authority for agencies to implement. A pluralist model of interest group negotiation might suggest that there is little to say about what Congress should
prescribe to agencies: whatever compromise is reached by a fair political process is appropriate for legislation. But, a comparison of Congress and agencies
suggests that too much statutory detail impedes an agency from realizing its
institutional strengths in technical expertise and flexibility. Section Four of this
Article will outline the benefits and detriments of statutory detail in environmental law. The most serious problem with statutory detail in establishment
legislation is that it thwarts systemic management for the national park units.
SECTION II: A DESCRIFTION OF THE TREND TOWARD GREATER STATUTORY

DETAIL
Establishment legislation, at its core, delegates to the NPS authority to
manage a unit of the national park system. But, at the same time that Congress
gives power to the Service, it also limits that power through management
mandates. In a similar way, in pollution control legislation, Congress typically
creates the framework for a regulatory program and delegates its implementation to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Increasingly, Congress
specifies details about how, what, and when the EPA should regulate. This
Section describes and compares the ways in which Congress has limited discretion of the NPS in establishment legislation and the EPA in pollution control statutes.
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A. CongressionalManagement of Pollution Regulation
Many commentators have observed the rise of statutory detail in pollution
control law.' For anyone who works with these "statutes of numbing complexity and detail"'29 it is a difficult trend to ignore. The increased congressional involvement in the details of pollution regulation takes many guises.
From the earliest days of modem federal pollution control legislation,
Congress established deadlines to constrain the discretion of the EPA. Instead
of delegating entirely to the agency the task of prioritizing activities, Congress
mandated that certain actions, especially standard-setting, be conducted within
certain time frames. The 1970 Clean Air Act established deadlines for overall
compliance, and, within the framework of those deadlines, created strict timetables for state preparation and EPA review of implementation plans.' The
1972 Clean Water Act called for "fishable, swimmable" waters everywhere by
July 1, 1983,3" and more detailed deadlines for the implementation of technology-based standards for over 500 separate categories of industries.32 By
1989, Congress and the courts had imposed 800 deadlines on the EPA.33 Subsequent enactments brought yet more deadlines.34
Most of these deadlines were too ambitious for the EPA to meet. 35 As a
result, the agency missed many deadlines and also adopted more streamlined
procedures for standard-setting than those "apparently contemplated by the
statute. '3 6 Still, the deadlines aided congressional oversight of the EPA by

28. See, e.g., ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW v (4th ed. 1995); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENvIRONMENTAL REGUIATION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 102-114 (2d ed. 1996); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLIcy: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIErY xxvii-xxix (1992); 1 WILIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 3.1A, at 43-44 (Supp. 1996); J. William Futrell,
Environmental Law History, in SuSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 43 (Celia Campbell-Mohn
et al. eds., 1993); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819. See generally, Joseph L. Sax,
Environmental Law in the Law Schools: What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,251 (1989) (discussing professors' frustration with teaching environmental law in light
of complex, changing statutes).
29. Sax, supra note 28, at 10,251.
30. WILuAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.6, at 198 (2d ed. 1994).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994).
32. Id. § 1311(b) (1994).
33. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323 (1991) (citing William K. Reilly, The Turning Point An Environmental Vision for the 1990s, Address for the Marshall Lecture before the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov. 27, 1989, in 20 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1386, 1389 (Dec. 8,
1989)); see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 828-30 nn.42-48 (citing numerous deadlines
established by Congress for the EPA).
34. RODGERS, supra note 28, § 3.1A, at 44 ("The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments call for
more than one hundred seventy-five new regulations, in excess of thirty guidance documents,
some thirty-five studies and reports, and more than fifty new research and investigation initiatives."). A substantial number of these requirements have deadlines attached to them.
35. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure,Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act,
21 ENvTL. L. 1647, 1651-52 (1991) (discussing the many reasons why agencies fail to meet deadlines).
36. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 122-36 (1977) (upholding the
EPA's technology based effluent limitations under § 301 of the Clean Water Act even though they
were promulgated without prior adoption of § 304 guidelines to set out the methodology the agen-
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establishing clear benchmarks. They also facilitated environmental group monitoring and enforcement of the pollution control programs through citizen suit
provisions.
Beginning in the 1980s, particularly with reauthorization legislation for the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)" and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)," and
continuing into the 1990, with the Clean Air Act revision,39 Congress began
to employ with greater frequency statutory tools that restricted EPA discretion
more than mere deadlines.' Congress employed "hammer" provisions to improve the EPA's compliance with deadlines. A hammer provision operates by
providing a draconian (prohibitive) rule tat will take effect on a particular
date unless the agency has promulgated a substitute regulation. For instance,
the 1984 RCRA amendments would have virtually banned the land disposal of
any hazardous waste for which the EPA had not promulgated a treatment
standard by a specified date. 4' A hammer provision creates incentives for
regulated entities to promote compromise to ensure swift agency action rather
than delay. The hammer provisions of RCRA were entirely successful in spurring the EPA to meet the deadlines for promulgating treatment standards.42
In some instances, Congress goes beyond time frames and specifies in
detail which substances the EPA should regulate. This is what Professors
Shapiro and Glicksman label restriction of regulatory discretion.43 While Congress determines for the agency whether to regulate certain pollutants, it gives
the agency discretion over how to regulate the pollutants. For instance, in the
1984 RCRA amendments, Congress specified particular solvents, dioxins, and
"California-list" wastes for the EPA to establish treatment standards by certain
dates." The EPA, though, retained a great deal of control over the process
for setting the treatment standards themselves. Similarly, the 1990 Clean Air
Act amendments listed 189 hazardous air pollutants for the EPA to establish
emission standards.43 Before Congress established the list of pollutants, the
EPA had promulgated emission standards for only six hazardous air pollutants
since Congress first authorized it to regulate these contaminants.'
In other instances, Congress specified how the EPA should regulate pollu-

cy would use in determining § 301 standards).
37. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments for 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 StaL 3221
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994)).
38. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 StaL 1613 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
39. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
40. See, Lazarus, supra note 28, at 340-42 (commenting on congressional prescription).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
42. ROBERT L. FiscHMAN ET AL., AN EwNmO ENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 130-31 (1996).
43. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 822.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(e)-(f). "California-list" wastes were regulated at the time under a California state land disposal program. Schedule for Land Disposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,300 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1). The EPA can modify or accept petitions to modify the list. Id. §
7412(b)(2).
46. See RODGERS, supra note 30, at 135-37.
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tion. This type of statutory detail restricts what Shapiro and Glicksman call
legislative discretion.47 For instance, in the 1984 RCRA Amendments, Congress gave the EPA some discretion in classifying certain substances as hazardous. But, once the agency classifies a substance as hazardous, it must require tanks used to store the substance to obtain approved leak detection and
other protective systems.'
More commonly in pollution control statutes, when Congress restricts
legislative discretion it also restricts regulatory discretion. For instance, the
1984 RCRA amendments outright banned the disposal of bulk or
noncontainerized liquid hazardous wastes in any landfill.5 ° This approach
leaves virtually no discretion for the agency outside of enforcement. Congress
was exceedingly specific on what the regulations regarding disposal of containerized liquid hazardous wastes in landfills should state: "Such regulations
shall also prohibit the disposal in landfills of liquids that have been absorbed
in materials that biodegrade or that release liquids when compressed as might
occur during routine landfill operations."'" In these 1984 RCRA Amendments, Congress went so far as to set out design standards for hazardous waste
landfills.
B. CongressionalManagement of NPS Units
During the same period when modern federal pollution control law
emerged and amassed layers of statutory details through amendments and
reauthorizations, NPS establishment legislation similarly evolved toward greater statutory detail. Although the pollution control field has displayed a proliferation of statutes protecting various media and dealing with a diverse assortment of polluting activities, most of the statutory detail has encrusted on the
dozen or so central statutes, which Congress revisits periodically for planned
reauthorizations and occasional amendments. In contrast, although Congress
has amended several existing NPS establishment statutes to add specific management mandates,52 it is legislation establishing new units that best manifests
the trend toward increased statutory detail.
Before illustrating the trend of increased statutory detail in NPS establishment legislation, it is important to acknowledge two related, but different and
more widely noted trends. First, in recent decades Congress has added a great

47.
48.
49.

Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 822.
42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(4); see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 837 n.86.
Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 837.

50. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)(1).
51. Id. § 6924(c)(2).
52. Congress frequently amends establishment statutes to adjust boundaries. But, for the
purposes of this Article, I am concerned only with amendments that mandate or constrain specific
management activities. See, e.g., Acadia National Park, Pub. L. No. 99-420, 100 Stat. 955 (1986)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 341 (1994)); Voyageurs National Park, Pub. L. No. 97-405,
96 Stat. 2028 (1983) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160a-1 (1994)); Redwood National
Park, Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 163-66 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 79b
(1994)); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 92-154, 85 Stat. 421 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271a (1994)).
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many units to the national park system. A review of park unit establishment
shows a surge in the early- and mid-1930s, 5 3 followed by lull until the modem heyday in the 1960s and 70s. The rate of new park unit establishment then
dropped with the start of the Reagan Administration, but remained greater than
the lull of the 1940s and 50s.
Second, the national park system has evolved from the basic bipartite
design of parks and monuments to a diverse taxonomy of fifteen different
categories, including a miscellaneous category for sui generis units such as the
White House and Prince William Forest Park, Virginia. 4 Although these
sheer numbers and categories account for much of the proliferation of provisions in the first part of the Conservation Title of the U.S. Code,55 the focus
of this Section is a shift in the content of the establishment legislation toward
greater specificity in management instructions to the Service. Although this
shift appears in the full range of national park system categories, this Section
limits discussion of statutory detail to national parks and monuments.56 Because these units are the oldest categories, there is a longer span of history to
observe. Even more importantly, the purposes of these reservations tends to
provide a better fit with the Organic Act goals than do any of the other categories.5 7 If there is a true system to be discerned in the assemblage of national park units, it should be manifest in national parks and monuments.
Many of the statutory tools Congress uses to limit the proprietary discretion of the NPS bear a close resemblance to the ones in pollution regulation.
For instance, Congress has increasingly employed deadlines to limit the
Service's discretion.58 Deadlines most frequently set time limits on the Service to publish mandated studies and management plans. The use of deadlines
in establishment legislation was relatively rare until the 1980s." 9

53. Contributing significantly to this surge was the transfer of over 30 military parks and
cemeteries from the War Department to the Service in 1933.
54. See infra text accompanying note 173 for a description of many of these categories.
55. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-460 (1994).
56. Unlike the other categories of reserved units of the National Park System, which are
designated by Congress, the President may exercise authority under the 1906 Antiquities Act to
reserve as national monuments landmarks, structures, and other objects of historic or scientific
interest situated on public lands. Id. § 431 note. Many national monuments, however, have establishment legislation endorsing their designation. Where they do not, the executive orders serve as
substitutes for establishment statutes. A small number of national monuments are not managed by
the Service and are therefore not part of the national park system. See, e.g., Proclamation No.
4611, 3 C.F.R. § 69 (1978) (establishing Admiralty Island National Monument, managed by the
U.S. Forest Service); Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996) (establishing Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, managed by the Bureau of Land Management).
57. Some categories, such as national historic sites, national battlefields, and national memorials are too small to be key elements in a system. Other categories, such as military parks, scenic
trails, and parkways serve purposes too specific to contribute significantly to understanding the
systeic relationship between establishment legislation and the Organic Act. Still other categories,
such as national lakeshores, national seashores, national preserves, and national recreation areas,
are excluded from the analysis because they contain few units or are relatively recent inventions,
and therefore frustrate reasonable comparison of trends through time. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§
21-460 (identifying the park system categories).
58. MANAGEMENT POUCIES, supra note 12, at 2:6 ("Congressionally directed plans will be
given a priority that enables their completion within the required time frame.").
59. An interesting topic for further research would be to determine how many of the con-
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Just as Congress has restricted the EPA's regulatory discretion by specifying what substances will be subject to restrictions, so too it has restricted the
Service's discretion by specifying what uses will be addressed by studies and
plans. Commentators frequently call for more research on the condition of
park resources and the effects of visitors and environmental stressors on the
national park system.' Chronically tight budgets make the congressionally
mandated studies the top funding priorities. Common subjects specified in
establishment legislation for study are suitability of lands for inclusion in a
park unit,6 potential wilderness designations," transportation,63 and park
resources. ' In the absence of this statutory detail, the Service would have
greater discretion for setting its research priorities systemically. In many cases,
the subjects mandated by Congress reflect key issues that the Service would
be remiss in neglecting, such as the study of rock art in Petroglyph National
Monument or erosion and sedimentation in Redwood National Park. However,
Congress does mandate action on other subjects that might not warrant a great
deal of attention from the standpoint of system management in an era of fiscal
austerity. One example is the 1988 mandate in amendments to the Olympic
National Park establishment legislation to study the location, size, and costs of

gressional deadlines the NPS actually met. If the Service's compliance record is better than the
EPA's, it may explain the absence of the more draconian tools, such as hammers, in the establishment statutes.
60. See COMMISSION ON RESEARCH AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT POLICY IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, NATIONAL PARKS: FROM VIGNErrES TO A GLOBAL ViEw 6-8 (1989) [hereinafter VIGNETTES] (calling for broad-based, on-going research by the NPS); THE VAR. AGENDA,

supra note 15, at 32 ("The National Park Service must engage in a sustained and integrated program of natural, cultural, and social science resource management and research aimed at acquiring
and using the information needed to manage and protect park resources."); Herman, supra note 2,
at 6-11 (discussing that from the inception of the National Park System, preservationists warned of
the dangers of excessive use); National Parks and Conservation Association, Parks in the Next
Century, NAT. PARKS, MarJApr. 1988, at 18, 20 (calling for a threefold increase in natural, cultural, and social science research staff).
61. See, e.g., Grand Canyon National Park, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2090 (1975) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228b(c) (1994)).
62. See, e.g., Death Valley National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4485 (1994) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa (1994)); Conagree Swamp National Monument, Pub. L.
No. 100-524, 102 Stat. 2606 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994));
Biscayne National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-287, 94 Stat. 600 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 410gg-3 (1994)); Channel Islands National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-199, 94 Stat. 77 (1980)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-5 (1994)); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1972
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160f(b)).
63. See, e.g., Grand Canyon National Park, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 228b(c)) (regulating dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Arches National Park, Pub. L. No.
92-155, 85 Stat. 422 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272c (1994)) (designating driveways); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1973 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
160j(l) (authorizing provisions for roads); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 88-590, 78
Stat. 938 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271c (1994)) (providing for construction of
roads).
64. See, e.g., Petroglyph National Monument, Pub. L. No. 101-313, 104 Stat. 276 (1990)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)) (establishing a Rock Art Research Center);
Channel Islands National Park, Pub. L. No. 96-199, 94 Stat. 75 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 410ff-2 (1994)) (providing for a natural resources study report); Capitol Reef National
Park, Pub. L. No. 92-207, 85 Stat. 740 (1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 273b (1994))
(discussing grazing privileges); Redwood National Park, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82 Stat. 931 (1968)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e) (1994)) (discussing erosion and sedimentation).
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a year-round visitor center in the Kalaloch area. 6
Mandated studies on particular subjects are related to planning, because
new information on the condition of resources or the effects of activities will
raise issues that a plan must address. For instance, a study of the effects of
grazing is likely to lead to information relevant to restricting, expanding,
and/or zoning with respect to grazing in the park unit. Congress increasingly
goes beyond specifying what the Service should study to list topics that the
Service must address in its management plan. Beginning in 1978, Congress
has required every unit of the national park system to prepare and "revise in a
timely manner" a general management plan (GMP). 6 Congress requires that
each plan include, but not limit itself to, four items: measures for resource
preservation, indications of types and intensities of development, identification
of and implementation commitments for visitor carrying capacities for all areas
of the unit, and potential boundary modifications.67 These 1978 requirements
replaced an older provision which mandated plans that focused on development of visitor facilities." After 1978, planning has been more broadly directed toward resource management and conservation. Although Service policy
commits units to discuss a more detailed list of topics in plans, such as zoning
and environmental impacts,' Congress supplements the four-part planning
mandate only through establishment legislation." Although Congress did not
explicitly mandate that the GMPs bind the subsequent management actions of
the Service, as it has done with planning mandates for the BLM and the Forest Service, 7' the GMPs nonetheless play a principal role in guiding management.
The specific mandates for plan content in establishment legislation vary
widely but demonstrate the same trend of increased congressional involvement
over the past few decades. Congress began mandating the contents of plans
two years before it required GMPs for all units. Since then, it has increasingly specified certain topics that must be addressed in the GMPs. Common
topics include identification of adjacent lands necessary to accomplish the

65.

Olympic National Park Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (1988).

66.

16 U.S.C. § la-7(b).

67. Id.
68. Act of Oct. 7, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-458, 90 Stat. 1942 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § la-7 (1994)).
69. MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 12, at 2:8.

70. Congress has mandated additional details in comprehensive planning for units established
or expanded under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of. 1980. 16 U.S.C. §
3191. Also, the National Environmental Policy Act requires that the Service consider a range of
alternatives and their environmental consequences when proposing a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). Service policy is
to prepare environmental impact statements for all GMPs. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
71. 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLIcKsMAN, PuBLIc NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW § 10F.02[3] (1995).
72. Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat. 2518 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 431 note) (requiring the Service to prepare a management plan indicating: property adjacent or
related to the monument which is necessary to fulfill monument purposes, the number of visitors
and the uses which the monument should accommodate, and the location and cost of facilities on
the monument site).
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purposes of the unit, location and cost of facilities, and the carrying capacity
of the unit for different types of activities. These topics all would likely be
addressed in a GMP even without a congressional mandate. Other establishment statutes, however, specify contents for the plan that seek to focus the
attention of the Service on particular management issues that might not otherwise receive special consideration. The 1978 amendments to the Redwood
National Park establishment legislation, in addition to mandating the usual
topics to be covered in the GMP, also required the Service to include:
the specific locations and types of foot trail access to the Tall Trees
Grove, of which one route shall, unless shown by the Secretary to be
inadvisable, principally traverse the east side of Redwood Creek
through the essentially virgin forest, connecting with the roadhead on
the west side of the park east of Orick."
This is an example of deeper congressional involvement in park management.
Similarly, Congress required Petroglyph National Monument to prepare a
GMP containing an implementation plan for the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978," 4 proposals for a visitor's center, and a plan for a
Rock Art Research Center."
Another type of congressional mandate specifies not what the subjects of
park unit management should be but rather how the Service should engage in
management and planning decisionmaking. This type of statutory detail is
analogous to the restrictions on legislative discretion of the EPA discussed
above. 76 Congress imposes procedural mandates primarily in three ways.
First, many establishment statutes require Service consultation with a state or
tribe in preparing a management plan77 or a study. 7 The establishment legis-

73. 16 U.S.C. § 79m(b)(4) (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1996, as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994).
75. 104 Stat. 276 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)).
76. See supra Section HA.
77. See Joshua Tree National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4487 (1994) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-3(c) (1994)) (requiring that the Secretary of State consult with the
Metropolitan Water District in developing emergency access plans); Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 272 (1990) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 461 note (1994)) (stating that the
management plan be prepared in consultation with the New Mexico Preservation Office, an advisory committee, and other interested parties); El Malpais National Monument, Pub. L. No. 100225, 101 Stat. 1539 (1987) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-41 (1994)) (requiring
management plans to be developed in consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, local Indian people, the New Mexico Historic Preservation Office, and the State of New
Mexico); Acadia National Park, Pub. L. No. 97-335, 96 Stat 1627 (1982) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 341 note (1994)) (requiring the preparation of a report establishing the carrying capacity for the Isle au Haut portion of Acadia National Park in consultation with the town); Channel Islands National Park, 94 Stat. 76 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-3(c)) (stating that
the Secretary must consult with the Nature Conservancy and the State of California in preparing a
GMP); Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat. 2517 (1976) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)) (requiring consultation with the governor of South Carolina in preparing GMP).
78. See Channel Islands National Park, 94 Stat. 75 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410ff-2(a)) (requiring consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the State of California, and
others on a study of natural resources); Arches National Park Establishment Act, 85 Stat. 422
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272) (requiring consultation with appropriate State and Federal entities on a study of road alignments); Canyonlands National Park, 85 Stat. 421 (codified as
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lation for Great Basin National Park is typical, requiring consultation with appropriate state agencies before implementation of the GMP.79 Frequently,
Congress will require the Service to consult with an appropriate state agency
before restricting fishing in a park unit.'
Second, a strong trend in recent establishment legislation (particularly
since 1986) is the creation of advisory commissions for unit management."'
Congress can shape national park system management by specifying the compositions of advisory committees to oversee and offer management advice to
park units. For instance, the establishment legislation for the Little Bighorn
Battlefield National Monument stipulates that its eleven-member advisory
commission include six representatives from Native American tribes that participated in the Battle of Little Bighorn or now live in the area, two nationally
recognized artists, and three individuals with knowledge of history, historic
preservation and landscape architecture. 2 Advisory commissions generally
are given the duty to advise the NPS on matters of park management,83 as
well as to help develop and implement a new or revised GMP. 4
Third, and less commonly, establishment legislation may require the Service to report back to Congress itself.' For example, the 1978 Redwood National Park amendments required that the NPS submit its GMP to the relevant
House and Senate committees by Jan. 1, 19 8 0 .' In addition, Congress mandated the Service to submit annual written reports to Congress for ten years on

amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271) (requiring consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the State of
California, and others on a study of natural resources).
79. Great Basin National Park, Pub. L. No. 99-565, 100 Stat. 3181, 3182 (1986) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-1 (1994)) (prohibiting adoption of GMP provisions relating to
grazing, and fish/wildlife management until after consultation with the State agency having jurisdiction over fish and wildlife).
80. See Great Basin National Park, 100 Stat. 3181; Biscayne National Park, 94 Stat. 599
(codified as amended 16 U.S.C. § 410gg-2(a)); Congaree Swamp National Monument, 90 Stat.
2517 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mrm-i); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1970
(1971) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160g).
81. See Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat 4487 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-6); Joshua Tree National Park, 108 Stat. 4489 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-27); Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, 105 Stat. 1631 (1991) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note); American Samoa National Park, 102 Stat. 2879, 2882 (1988)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410qq-2(g)); Poverty Point National Monument, 102 Stat.
2803, 2804 (1994) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)); Acadia National Park,
Pub. L. No. 99-420, 100 Stat. 955, 959 (1986) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 341 note).
82. Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, 105 Stat. 1631 (1991) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note).
83. See American Samoa National Park, 102 Stat. 2882 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410qq-2(g) (1994)); Acadia National Park, 100 Stat. 959 (1986) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 341 note).
84. See Joshua Tree National Park, 108 Stat. 4489 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410ff-27); Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4487 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
410aaa-6).
85. See Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 276 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
431 note) (requiring report to Congress on location, condition, and technical assistance needed for
care of related rock art located outside of the monument boundaries); Grand Canyon National Park
Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228g) (requiring report to
Congress of any dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Canyonlands National Park, 85 Stat. 42
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271f) (requiring report to Congress on road alignments).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 79m(b).
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the status of: payment for property acquired; actions taken regarding land
management practices and watershed rehabilitation efforts; efforts to mitigate
adverse economic impacts; special employment requirements; a new bypass
highway and an agreement for the donation of state lands; and the GMP. s7
Finally, just as Congress has become more assertive by regulating directly
in pollution statutes, it has also in some establishment legislation made zoning
and management decisions directly. This contrasts with the traditional, and
still-predominant, approach of delegating management decisions in reliance on
the expert judgment of the Service and/or on the procedural safeguards of
planning and consultation. Consider Congress's approach to the question of an
entrance fee to Channel Islands National Park. Use of the approaches described above might require the NPS to study the issue of an entrance fee, or
even to make the fee decision in consultation with an advisory committee or
some other entity (such as a state agency). Instead, though, Congress simply
declared: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no fees shall be
charged for entrance or admission to the park."'
In the western contiguous states, newly established or enlarged parks and
monuments often occur where ranchers have existing federal permits to graze
cattle. Congress frequently specifies precisely how much longer grazing will
be allowed in these units." Although the Service retains authority to regulate
the conditions of grazing, Congress here makes the principal management
decision of condoning grazing use for a specified period of time.
Two observations emerge from this Section's exploration of statutory
detail in establishment legislation. First, and more important, the establishment
statutes manifest a strong trend of increased congressional involvement in
national park system management. This Section discussed only provisions
unambiguously containing requirements or mandates. These provisions contain
the statutory term "shall." There are additional provisions in establishment
legislation that illustrate the trend of statutory detail but that use the more
permissive terms, "may" or "is authorized to." Congress likely uses these

87. Id. § 79m(a).
88. Id. § 410ff-6 (1994).
89. See, e.g., Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4486 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 410aaa-5) (stating that "grazing shall continue at no more than the current level"); El Malpais
National Monument, 101 Stat. 1542 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-32) (extending
existing permits until December 31, 1997); Great Basin National Park, 100 Stat. 3182 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410mam-l) (allowing grazing to the same extent as permitted on July 1,
1985); Fossil Butte National Monument, 86 Stat. 1069 (grazing shall be allowed for at least ten
years); Capitol Reef National Park, 85 Stat. 740 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 273(b))
(grazing permits to be allowed for one lease period with the possibility for one renewal); Arches
National Park, 85 Stat. 422 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 272b) (permitting grazing privileges to continue for the remainder of the term and one subsequent period); Canyonlands National
Park, 78 Stat. 938 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271b) (permitting grazing privileges to
continue for the remainder of the term and one period subsequent).
90. See, e.g., Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 431 note) ("is authorized to undertake research and assist in the management and protection of Rio Grande style rock art sites"); Everglades National Park and Expansion Act, 103 Stat.
1947 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410r-6) ("is authorized to enter" into concession contracts with owners of tour and airboat facilities); North Cascades National Park, 102 StaL 3963
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note) ("is authorized" to remove and dispose of trees to
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terms to indicate a desire for, without actually mandating, the Service to engage in a particular task. Congress may even express this desire explicitly, as
when it states that the Service "is authorized and encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements... for the protection and interpretation of the Grand
Canyon."' Even where Congress does not link permissive language with explicit encouragement, it still may influence NPS management. The Service
generally seeks the good favor of Congress, particularly for appropriations or
boundary expansion. The Service likely would try to avoid harsh congressional
oversight hearings. Noncompliance with permissive statutory details in itself
may not create problems for the agency in Congress. However, the Service
surely would first seriously consider management preferences expressed in
establishment legislation and then establish a record to justify noncompliance.
This, in itself, helps shape national park system management.
Second, the statutory detail Congress has incorporated into establishment
legislation parallels in kind the statutory details circumscribing the EPA's
discretion in implementing pollution regulation. The common use of deadlines,
the specification of what substances or subjects to address in implementation
and management, and the specification of how the agencies are to proceed
with their tasks suggest that the better ventilated discussion of the increased
statutory detail in pollution control may illuminate issues associated with management of the national park system. The next Section reviews explanations
offered to explain this trend in the pollution control field and discusses whether they may aid in understanding the similar trend in NPS legislation. It also
offers an explanation that ties together both strands of environmental law.

protect power lines); Olympic National Park, 102 Stat. 3961 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1132 note) ("is authorized" to upgrade, maintain, and replace an underground pipeline); El
Malpais National Monument, 101 Stat. 1548 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-I) ("is
authorized and encouraged" to enter into cooperative agreements with other Federal, state, and
local agencies, Indian tribes, and non-profit entities; "is authorized" to establish an advisory committee comprised of Indians to help implement access rules); Great Basin National Park, 100 StaL
3182 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410ram-2) ("may" maintain existing water-related range
improvements); Kenai Fjords National Park, 94 Stat. 2379 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
431 note) ("is authorized" to develop access to and allow use of mechanized equipment on the
Harding Icefield); Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2090 ("is authorized to"
enter into cooperative agreements with other entities to protect the canyon); Voyageurs National
Park, 84 Stat. 1970 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 160 (1994)) (authorizing roads as are
needed for public access); Voyageurs National Park, 84 Stat. 1972 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 160 (1994)) ("may" include subjects of winter sports, seaplane use, and watercraft use in
comprehensive plan; "is authorized" to make provisions for any roads as are necessary for public
access); Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 83 Stat. 100 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
403h-15) ("is authorized to" convey rights-of-way to Tennessee; "is authorized to" construct an
entrance to the park in North Carolina); Canyonlands National Park, Pub. L. No. 88-590, 78 Stat.
934 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 271) ("may" select the location(s) for entrance road(s)
and construct any structure necessary for the park; "is authorized" to consult with the Secretary of
Agriculture on the location and extension of a forest development road); Carlsbad Caverns National Park, 77 Stat. 818 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 407e-407h) ("is authorized to" convey a
right-of-way to New Mexico); Wupatki National Monument, Pub. L. No. 87-136, 75 Stat. 337
("may" accept donation of a road right-of-way).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 228e (1994).
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HI: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GROWTH IN STATUTORY DETAIL

The literature that describes the trend of increasing statutory detail in
pollution control law also offers a range of explanations for the trend. While
many of these explanations apply as well to the parallel trend in national park
system management, a comparison of the two strands of environmental law
reveals a broader pattern that accounts for increasing statutory detail. In both
the pollution control and the national park system legislation, increased statutory detail is associated with second-generation problems. Second-generation
problems arise after initial approaches that address abatement or conservation
have reached the limits of relatively low-cost solutions. This Section will describe the transition from first- to second-generation legislation after first reviewing the more frequently offered, specific explanations for increased statutory detail.
As a preliminary matter, we can reject some explanations for the rise in
statutory detail in the pollution control area which are not applicable to national park establishment legislation.' Professors Shapiro and Glicksman explain
increased congressional management of the EPA beginning in the 1980s, in
part, as a reaction to shifts in oversight by federal courts and the president's
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). President Reagan's appointments
of judicial conservatives, increased deference to agencies under these judges
and the Chevron" doctrine, and tightening standing requirements for citizens
seeking review of agency action94 all left a void in judicial oversight of the
EPA that Congress sought to fill by establishing more specific requirements in
legislation."' At the same time, Congress sought to counter-balance more intensive scrutiny of EPA's proposed regulations by the OMB, an executive

92. We can also put aside a possible explanation for statutory detail generally, which has
little application in pollution control law. When Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), declared unconstitutional the legislative veto, Congress lost a
tool of retrospective oversight. Although this might contribute somewhat to the greater prospective
limitations through statutory mandates, the legislative veto was not a common tool in pollution
control law before Chadha. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSITUTE, 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION 4-9, 4-10 (Sheldon M. Novick, ed. 1996) (citing only two legislative veto provisions in
pollution control law: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 25, 7 U.S.C. §
136(w) (1994), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 305, 42 U.S.C. § 9655 (1994)). In natural resources law, the legislative veto appears significantly and repeatedly in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011784 (1994), but I found no trace of it in NPS establishment legislation. Retrospective oversight
through reporting requirements, however, does appear in establishment legislation. See, e.g.,
Petroglyph National Monument, 104 Stat. 276 (requiring a report to congressional committees of
the location, condition, and the technical assistance needed for care of related rock art located
outside of the monument boundaries); Redwood National Park, 92 Stat. 170 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 79m) (requiring Service to submit plan to congressional committees); Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act, 88 Stat. 2090 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 228g)
(requiring a report to Congress of any dangerous or detrimental aircraft use); Canyonlands National Park, 85 Stat. 421 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2710 (requiring a report to Congress on
a road alignment study).
93. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984).
94. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
95. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 845-70.
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office closely controlled by the White House and widely viewed as hostile to
strict pollution abatement. 9
While these developments certainly can spur Congress to assert greater
control over agency behavior through more specific mandates in statutes, they
are of little relevance to national park system management. Proprietary management of federal resources has traditionally enjoyed greater deference than
the regulation of the private sector that EPA conducts. In particular, the Service has never been a popular target for judicial review. Interest groups hardly
relish the prospect of challenging the agency that retains a wholesome reputation in the public mind. Moreover, the Service has always enjoyed great deference by the federal courts, even as other land management agencies have lost
some of their traditional insulation from judicial oversight.' Therefore, the
trends that diminished the oversight role of courts over the EPA have had little
impact on NPS behavior, which has been enjoined by courts only in exceptional cases. 9
Furthermore, OMB oversight has focused on "notice and comment," informal rulemaking under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.'
Most management decisions and all national park unit GMPs are made outside
of this regulatory framework."° So, the Service has not faced the intense
oversight by the OMB that has shaped the behavior of the EPA.
Another role played by the OMB, however, the compilation of the
president's proposed federal budget, has had some, though minor, relevance in
explaining increased statutory detail. Historically, an important tool of congressional control over agency behavior has been appropriations. If Congress
is displeased with the direction an agency is taking, it may threaten to reduce
the agency's budget. This tool, however, became less effective in the environmental area throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations because budget
requests by the executive branch consistently fell below actual appropriations.
The congressional threat of reducing budgets is a less effective tool when the
administration actually wants lower appropriations than Congress in the first
place. With reduced maneuverability in the appropriations process for shaping
environmental policy, Congress might turn to actual authorization legislation in
order to influence agencies. This may explain some of the increased statutory
detail in both pollution control and in NPS establishment legislation.
Regardless of the disparity between executive budget requests and con-

96. Id. at 842; Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 194-97 (1991); see
Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.D.C. 1986) (providing a specific example of OMB hostility to environmental regulation). Recent charters for OMB oversight
can be found in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted as amended in 5
U.SC. § 601 (1994); and Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
97. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 71, at §§ 10F.02[3], 14.01, 14.02[2].
98. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (D. Ariz. 1989) (enjoining the
Service from allowing construction of new facilities on the north rim of the Grand Canyon until it
complied with the National Environmental Policy Act and its own management policies).
99. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
100. Id. § 553(a)(2).
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gressional appropriations, the overall fiscal austerity of the past fifteen years
created a vicious cycle that now drives Congress to impose ever more mandates on both the EPA and the NPS. As budgets get tighter, agencies are able
to do less.' Therefore, statutory mandates, which are always a priority for
agencies, command a greater proportion of total agency activities. With a
diminishing likelihood that agencies will have the resources to engage in discretionary tasks, a member of Congress seeking to influence an agency to do
something will be more motivated to place a mandate in legislation than to
lobby the agency informally. The cycle worsens as Congress legislates more
mandates and squeezes further the agency's ability to engage in discretionary
activities. This dynamic has been noted in the context of legislative deadlines
for the EPA."2 Every time Congress imposes a new deadline on the EPA,
the agency is less able to accomplish tasks for which no statutory deadline exists. Therefore, Congress must continue to impose deadlines whenever it wants
the agency actually to do something. The EPA priorities are now so driven by
meeting congressional deadlines that the agency cannot comprehensively plan
effectively to implement broad goals, such as reducing exposure to contaminants that generate the greatest health risks. 03 The growth in statutory detail
in NPS establishment legislation evinces this same dynamic, especially in the
deadline and mandated study provisions.
The most widely noted reason why Congress has not given the EPA flexibility to set its own priorities based on broad principles, such as risk reduction,
is distrust of the ability and the resolve of the agency to achieve the goals of
environmental protection. Although distrust is a characteristic tension of divided government, when one party controls the White House and another the
Congress, the policies and appointments of the Reagan administration raised
the level of distrust in the environmental area to unprecedented heights." 4
Professors Shapiro and Glicksman document the extensive legislative history
showing that Congress believed that the EPA refused to act when it should
have, delayed regulations, and implemented pollution control programs in a
manner inconsistent with the intent of authorizing legislation." 5 The scandals
involving EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford and her deputies also
severely eroded congressional trust." The polarization of congressional-executive relations in the early 1980s accelerated the momentum of the trend of
increased statutory detail.

101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing NPS budget trends).
102. William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, IssuES IN So. & TECH., Spring
1985, at 19.
103.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETING PRIORTES, GETrING RE-

SULTS: A NEW DmECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 8, 131 (1995).
104. James J. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the

1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352-53 (1986); Percival, supra note 96, at 147-54; Erik H.
Corwin, Note, Congressional Limits on Agency Discretion:A Case Study of the Hazardous and

Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 524-28 (1992). The antecedents to
the rise in congressional distrust of the EPA in the 1980s date back to the birth of the agency. See
Lazarus, supra note 33, at 323.

105.

Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 826-27.

106.

Futrell, supra note 28, at 50.
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Although Congress distrusted Secretary of the Interior James Watt to
implement an environmental agenda at least as much as Anne GorsuchBurford, the NPS did not become a lightning rod for implementation controversy to the extent that the EPA did. Certainly, the Department of the Interior
made a number of controversial decisions that undercut national park system
stewardship."° However, with its longer tradition of non-partisan professionalism, its widespread public support for conservation, and its less threatening
proprietary mandate, the NPS found itself more insulated from both stark
policy reversals and intense congressional reaction than the EPA."a Still, it
is likely that the spirit of distrust in the pollution control area permeated NPS
establishment legislation somewhat and amplified the trend toward statutory
detail.
Another contributing factor noted in the pollution control area also helps
explain increased congressional management of the national park system. Congress legislates more detailed management mandates because it can. The proliferation of professional committee staffs in all areas of national legislation
increases statutory detail."l Longstanding or ambitious committee or subcommittee chairs may also sponsor investigations and long-term projects that
lead to detailed legislation.'
For all the applicability of the manifold explanations for statutory detail in
pollution control law to NPS establishment legislation, there are still a couple
of missing pieces to the puzzle. One explanation for the statutory detail in
establishment legislation relates to the Organic Act, which has no analog in
pollution control. It may well be that the tension between providing for enjoyment (recreation) and leaving units unimpaired (preservation) creates an impossible paradox for the NPS to solve. When important issues are irreconcilable under the Organic Act (including the 1978 clarifying amendments), Congress needs to intervene with specific instructions for the Service. This may be
an important factor in major NPS issues, such as restoration of the Everglades."' However, it fails to explain the majority of the statutory mandates

107. JONATHAN LASH Er AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 279-298 (1984); John Kenney, Interior Sub Rosa: Political Ap-

pointees Use the Parks as Pawns, NAT. PARKS, SeptJOcL 1989, at 12.
108. Congress legislated, in part, in response to a high level of public concern about the dangers of toxic pollution. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 842; Corwin, supra note 104,
at 532.
109. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
43-45 (1982); James P. Hill, The Third House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Government: The Impact of CongressionalCommittee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 247, 247-48 (1986); Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 841.
110. Examples include former representatives Philip Burton and John Seiberling in the area of
NPS establishment legislation and former representative James Florio in the area of hazardous
waste legislation. Congressional oversight of the EPA is particularly zealous. Richard J. Lazarus,
The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,
206, 210-12 (1991).
111. The 1989 amendments to the establishment legislation expanded the size of Everglades
National Park; closed the park to the operation of airboats, subject to certain variances; and modified water delivery projects in the region to restore the natural hydrologic conditions. Everglades
National Park, 103 Stat. 1946 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410r-5 to 410r-8).
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that involve less profound issues of national park system management, such as
the establishment of advisory commissions or the preparation of particular
studies. It does highlight, though, the close relationship between the lack of
statutory detail in the overarching mandate and the need for greater elaboration
in the implementing statutes.
The second missing piece of the puzzle of statutory detail more robustly
applies to both pollution control and natural resource management. In both
areas, Congress turns to greater statutory detail after it has delegated to agen' 2
cies the straightforward, "first-generation," problems. "Second-generation"
problems are those that remain after Congress and agencies address the relatively lower-cost, easier issues in a field. In the pollution control context, the
classic first-generation problems were the stationary point sources of contamination that were employing virtually no abatement technology before 1970.
Professor Elliott observes that these "easy sources: the large coal-fired utility
boilers, the large chemical plants, the refineries," have been successfully regulated to reduce large discharges." 3 We are then left with ."small, diffuse
sources that will prove very difficult to regulate using traditional techniques."" 4 When Congress legislated in general terms that the EPA should
begin requiring polluters to apply abatement technology, the "first burst" of
marginal environmental improvement was great. However, as Professor Krier
observes, the next increment of improvement is more difficult to accomplish
due, in part, to increased marginal costs of abatement and, in part, to polluters
learning how to evade expensive regulation.' Therefore, Congress returns to
draft more elaborate schemes to catch evaders, squeeze less environmental
improvement out of greater marginal costs, exempt industries that face severe
financial hardship, and experiment with new programs to prospect for new
"first bursts."
In the NPS context, the first-generation problems were the earlier-designated units which had fewer existing uses that would be incompatible with
national park system status." 6 There have always been some political conflicts over foreclosing potential economic uses of lands designated as national

112. Other commentators have used the terms "first-generation" and "second-generation" to
refer to different aspects of environmental law. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1352-55 (1985) (describing two phases of a reform proposal to create a market-based system of pollution control through tradeable
permits).
113. E. Donald Elliott, EnvironmentalLaw at a Crossroad,20 N. KY. L. REv. 1, 10 (1992).
114. Id.; see also, Samuel A. Bleicher, Regulation of Pollution: Is the System Mature or
Senile, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. i,iii (1990) (noting that the first wave of environmental statutes
"quickly ran up against many economic and technical realities that made enforcement politically
unacceptable").
115. See James E. Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVrL. L. 11, 17,
23-24 (1990) ("[GJenerally speaking, the marginal costs of control go up the more one has already
controlled. It is one thing to cut emissions from a source by ninety percent, for example, and quite
another to cut the remaining ten percent by ninety percent again ....");Arnold Reitze Jr., Environmental Policy-4t Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 116-117 (1989).
116.

See generally JOHN ISE, OUR NATIONAL PARK POLIcY: A CRIcAL HISTORY (1961)

(presenting a thoroughly comprehensive history of park administration that describes all of the
serious conflicts affecting the first-generation park units).
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parks or monuments. Alfred Runte makes a strong case for the "worthless
lands" hypothesis, that Congress was willing to withdraw from economic development as national parks only those areas for which there was no evidence
of commercial value for mining, farming, and logging." 7 He reviews the legislative history of a number of early parks, including Yellowstone," 8
Sequoia," 9 Mt. Rainier, 2 ° and Crater Lake, 2 ' to show that boundaries
and park proponents' arguments were crafted to avoid the taint of economic
develoipment obstructionism.
But, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, conflicts which had been mapped
outside of park boundaries began creeping into existing units as well as creating problems for additions to the park system. For instance, in 1933, when
President Hoover established Death Valley National Monument, a portion of
the eastern border was shifted to exclude an existing mining operation. 22 By
1975, Tenneco Corp. was poised to increase mining on claims it owned within
the monument. Congress held hearings on mining in the parks and enacted the
National Park Mining Regulation Act.'2 3 The legislation struck a compromise
between mining interests and preservationists, who sought a prohibition of
mining in the national park system. For Tenneco, the new law did little more
than regulate its mining, which it could continue on all claims it was currently
working.'24 Congress also required the Service to identify portions of the
monument that might be abolished "to exclude significant mineral deposits and
to decrease possible acquisition costs."'" Alfred Runte notes that "[t]hose
portions of Death Valley that survived, in short, apparently would contain
nothing of lasting economic value."'2
Over the past thirty years, as economic development and other forms of
use incompatible with national park system status have pervaded more of the
public domain, the conflicts over uses to be allowed in new units have increased. Congress already has added the easy lands to the national park system.' Newly designated units are more difficult in the sense that there are
more stakeholders who currently use the land. More people have more expectations of continued use of the public lands than ever before. Users of lands
subject to proposed establishment legislation, which might interfere with or
prohibit continued use, face an easier task organizing to gain special provi-

117. RUNTE, supra note 18, at 1-9.
118. Id. at 48-55.
119. Id. at60-64.
120. Id. at 65-67.
121. Id. at 67-68.
122. Id. at 193.
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (1994).
124. The statute gave the Service authority to regulate mining to ensure that it is conducted so
as to prevent or minimize damage to the environment and park resources. Id.
125. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-429, 90 Stat. 1342 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1905 (1994) (expired two years after enactment)). The California Desert Protection Act,
discussed infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text, abolished Death Valley National Monument
in 1994. 90 Stat. 1342.
126. RUNTE, supra note 18, at 194.
127. Id. at 213.
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sions than do the more diffuse interests concerned about the collective benefits
of the national park system."
Even relatively small units, such as Petroglyph National Monument may
present Congress with complex land use problems because of their proximity
to development which may threaten park unit resources. Petroglyph National
Monument's 7000 acres lie on an escarpment along the western edge of Albuquerque. Residential development bumps up against the eastern boundary of
the monument, and development of the city is planned to ,leapfrog over to the
west of the monument as well. 29 The close proximity of such a large number of people creates intense disputes over the appropriate balance between
recreation (in this case, access to pristine areas of the monument, and horse
and bicycle trails) and preservation (in this case, protection of rock art from
vandalism and erosion). 3 Perhaps the most acute conflict arises over proposals to develop more trails in and to build a new road through the monument. These proposals generate heated opposition from those who want the
monument managed to accommodate the earth-based religious practices of
local Pueblo Indians, who view the monument area as sacred. 3' Not surprisingly, these conflicts shaped the 1990 establishment legislation. To protect the
rock art, Congress mandated not only a resource protection program in the
GMP but also a plan to establish a Rock Art Research Center.'32 Congress
also authorized the Service to participate in the dispute over the proposed road
through the monument.'33 Finally, the establishment legislation includes avenues for Native Americans to advance their interests in monument management. 134
To compromise with ranchers holding federal grazing permits in the area
established as Great Basin National Park in 1986, Congress required the NPS
to allow grazing to continue to the same extent as was occurring on July 1,
1985. 31 In addition to removing management discretion to reduce grazing
from the Service, Congress also required the agency to submit, within three

128. Professors Krier and Gillette note this problem of collective action in the pollution control context. James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, Essay, The Un-Easy Case for Technological
Optimism, 84 MINct. L. REV. 405, 426 (1985). See generally, RuSSELL HARDIN, COLLEcrvE
ACTION (1982) (analyzing the theory of collective action itself); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTlVE AcTION (1965) (analyzing the general theory of collective action).

129. Tony Davis, Sunbelt Confrontation, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Nov. 1, 1993, at 1, 10-13.
130. Id.; Ruth Haas, An Urban Park Is Surrounded by Controversy, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Dec. 12, 1994, at 13.
131. Haas, supra note 130, at 13.
132. Petroglyph National Monument, Pub. L. No. 101-313, § 108, 104 Stat. 272, 276 (1990)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 note (1994)).
133. Id. § 106, 104 Stat. 275. "The Secretary may participate in land use and transportation
management planning conducted by appropriate local authorities for lands adjacent to the monument and may provide technical assistance to such authorities and affected landowners for such
planning." Id.
134. Id. § 108(c), 104 Stat. 276 (consultation on GMP with Indian tribes); id. § 110, 104 Stat.
277 (establishment of an advisory commission including "one member, who shall have professional expertise in Indian history or ceremonial activities, appointed from recommendations submitted
by the All Indian Pueblo Council"); id. § 108(a)(4), 104 Stat. 276 (inclusion in the GMP of a plan
to implement the Native American Religious Freedom Act).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 410mm-l(e) (1994).
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years, to relevant congressional committees a management plan that included
discussion of grazing." The establishment legislation also states: "Existing
water-related range improvements inside the park may be maintained by the
Secretary or the persons benefitting from them, subject to reasonable regulation by the Secretary."' 37 A final provision on grazing authorizes negotiations
to occur for the purpose of exchanging grazing permits on land within the
park for allotments outside of the park. 3 In these restrictions, Congress established an oversight mechanism, substituted its own mandate for the
agency's judgment on grazing, and limited the agency's ability to respond to
public opinion."'
The Petroglyph and Great Basin examples from the past decade illustrate,
in part, the trend of greater statutory detail described in Section Two of this
Article. But, they also illustrate how the second-generation problem of a more
complex existing land use overlay for park units creates conflicts that Congress addresses in establishment statutes. Although Congress has addressed
land use conflicts in the national park system for many decades, the increasing
numbers of conflicts generate more detailed amendments to existing units and
more elaborate establishment statutes for new units. Congressional mandates
often may be the only way to win the necessary support to create new park
units."4° Nonetheless, the statutory detail does hamper systemic management
of the national park system by the Service. The next Section considers this and
other burdens of statutory detail, as well as the benefits.
SECTION IV: THE EFFECTS OF STATUTORY DETAIL

Statutory detail in establishment legislation benefits the national park
system in many respects. Most important, as the second-generation problem
illustrates, statutory detail that manifests delicate political compromise allows
meritorious additions to the system that, without compromise, might not garner
sufficient support for establishment. As a representative democratic institution,
Congress might give voice to interests that would otherwise go unrecognized
by the Service. Particularly in national park system management, where application of the Organic Act may not offer clear management guidance, statutory
detail can provide helpful guideposts for agency discretion. 4'
Agency decision-makers often welcome congressional mandates on controversial issues because the mandates relieve the officials of responsibility for
politically sensitive decisions. For instance, in the Barataria Marsh Unit of
Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve establishment legislation,

136. Id. § 410mm-l(c).
137. Id. § 410mm-l(g).
138. Id. § 410mm-l(f).
139. Jon Christensen, A Bitter Rancher and a Failed Compromise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 11 ("Since Great Basin National Park was put on the map, staff have been inundated with complaints" about grazing.).
140. See id.
141. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 844 (citing the benefit of congressional mandates in pollution control statutes).
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Congress explicitly commanded the Service to continue to permit hunting,
fishing, and trapping. 4 This shields the NPS from the criticism it would receive if it resolved the land use dispute itself.'43 Professors Shapiro and
Glicksman observe that "[d]eadlines can assist agency decisionmaking by mitigating outside pressures to avoid reaching a decision and giving the agency a
reason to end its analysis and make a difficult, but necessary decision."'"4
Particularly because the effects of many resource management decisions are
indeterminate," deadlines may speed the process of formulating and implementing management plans.
Of course, there are problems associated with all of these benefits. Although Congress is, indeed, a democratically elected institution, its committee
structure operates much like medieval fiefdoms. Committees wield power,
particularly over issues such as park establishment that are not at the fore of
social controversy, that receive little scrutiny by Congress at large, and that
therefore create "serious problems of political responsibility."" The splintered jurisdiction and closely guarded turf of congressional committees, which
drive the routine legislative process, insulate much establishment legislation
from the deliberative spotlight." 7 As Professor Stewart observes, this leaves
the statutory details to "a submerged micropolitical process without open and
regular procedures.""' In establishment legislation, this process favors
stakeholders with concentrated interests in park unit management, who can
most easily organize to lobby subcommittee chairs and staff." Thus, the
"Christmas Tree" provisions criticized in detailed pollution control statutes and
designed to benefit particular regions and stakeholders50 also appear in detailed establishment legislation.
For instance, the detailed California Desert Protection Act'' grandfathers specific mining claims, by name, to protect them from more stringent
regulation resulting from the designation of the Mojave National Preserve.'52
Congress sought to satisfy regional concerns by establishing advisory commissions with members that include an elected official for each county within the

142. Jean Lafitte National Historical Park, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3536 (1978) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 230(d) (1994)). See note 89 for other examples of congressional grazing prescriptions.
143. Professor Yaffee observed that statutory prohibitions, although they restrict agency discretion, may help agencies that would otherwise not muster the political will to drive a hard bargain with stakeholders. STEvEN LEWIs YAFFEE, PRoflBrnvE PoLCv 149-62 (1982).
144. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 830.
145. Professor Latin discusses this as a reason why environmental agencies avoid resolving
disputed issues. Latin, supra note 35, at 1659.
146. Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 332 (1987).
147. See J.William Futrell, The Administration of EnvironmentalLaw, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 28, 93, 97-102.
148. Stewart, supra note 146, at 332.
149. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
150. See David Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act,
30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 748-51 (1983); Stewart, supra note 146, at 332.
151. Death Valley National Park, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 41aaa to 410bbb-6 (1994)).
152. Death Valley National Park, 108 Stat. 4491 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa49 (1994)).
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unit and representatives of private property owners, grazers, and miners, for
Death Valley National Park,'53 Joshua Tree National Park, 5 4 and Mojave
National Preserve.' 55 These commissions advise the Service on the development and implementation of comprehensive management plans. Also, tacked
onto the end of the statute are provisions establishing a New Orleans Jazz National Historical Park, and a "Christmas Tree" provision (however worthy) that
has no bearing on California desert protection.
Moreover, the statutory mandates inserted by the congressional committees assert control of national park system management at the expense of the
president. The Department of the Interior officials would otherwise exercise
discretion in the service of the chief executive. Professor Mashaw asserts that:
The president has no particular constituency to which he or she has
special responsibility to deliver benefits. Presidents are hardly cut off
from pork-barrel politics. Yet issues of national scope and the
candidates' positions on those issues are the essence of presidential
politics. Citizens vote for a president based almost wholly on a perception of the difference that one
or another candidate might make to
56
general governmental policies.
Although this might be true as a general matter, the particular issues of park
management are so low on the national agenda that the Service might be as
susceptible to the compromise of national interests for parochial politics as
Congress. 7
An important criticism of statutory detail contrasts the review for rationality that agency regulations would need to pass before these sorts of provisions
could be implemented. This criticism applies more strongly in the pollution
control area, where the EPA makes most of its decisions through rulemaking,
and where the OMB is extensively involved in cost-benefit review. Even in
the area of judicial review, the NPS enjoys an especially high degree of deference. "' Still, judicial review, even of informal unit-specific management,
will nonetheless require an administrative record showing that the agency's
decision was "based on a consideration of the relevant factors,"' 59 and "a
reasoned assessment of competing values."'" Of course, statutory management prescriptions need not meet even this deferential standard.
In the case of the NPS, far more important than the relative benefits of an
agency's national political agenda and judicial oversight, is its technical expertise. However strengthened the staffs of congressional committees have be-

153. 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-6.
154. Id. § 410aaa-27.
155. Id. § 410aaa-58.
156. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985).
157. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, GlacierNational Park and Its Neighbors: A
Study of FederalInteragency Relations, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1987).
158. See 2 CoGiNs & GtICKSMAN, supra note 71, at § 10F.02[3].
159. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
160. See Mashaw, supra note 156, at 93.
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come over the past thirty years, they still cannot compare with the thousands
of people employed by the Service in positions both to observe resources and
people, and to engage in scientific management. The literature on the relative
institutional strengths of agencies (as compared to Congress) stresses the superior managerial efficiency and expertise of agencies.'
Former Representative Florio notes that decisions in Congress are based
on compromise rather than application of technical expertise to answer important questions. 62 Certainly, some of the issues addressed in establishment
legislation are value judgments not susceptible to the application of physical or
social science expertise. However, many are not. The increase in management
mandates comes at a time when the Service, like the other federal land management agencies, must transform from an agency driven by the seat-of-thepants experience of hierarchical managers to one that applies the interdisciplinary findings of technical staff who specialize in a range of fields.6 3 Statutory detail hampers the ability of the NPS to base its decisions on the findings of biologists, ecologists, educators, geologists, archeologists, historians,
anthropologists, and economists. The National Research Council describes the
potential benefits of a science-based management model: "Although an adequate science program alone cannot ensure the integrity of the national parks,
it can enable faster identification of problems, greater understanding of causes
and effects, and better insights about the prevention, mitigation, and management of problems."'" The Council also notes that, although a dozen major
reviews of NPS science and management over a period of 30 years all advocated strengthening science to improve management, few of the recurring
recommendations have been implemented."
Furthermore, statutory detail impairs the flexibility required to manage
resources in the face of changing (usually growing) public demands to use
park units, and increased scientific understanding of the condition of resources
and the impacts of use on resources. Once management issues are resolved by
Congress, they are frozen in place and much more difficult to modify than
agency decisions.'" The emerging consensus favoring the use of adaptive
management as a form of ecosystem planning necessitates continual monitoring and iteration of management decisions as hypotheses. 67 Professor Keiter
notes that ecosystem management must draw heavily on scientific principles
and research so that it "can be designed and adjusted to minimize disruption

161. See Mashaw, supra note 156, at 82; Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 28, at 844;
Corwin, supra note 104, at 521-22.
162. Florio, supra note 104, at 379. This may be one of the few issues on which former
Democratic Representative Florio and former Republican Senator Symms agreed. Id. at 371.
163. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 11.
164.

NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNcIL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL PARKS 2 (1992).

165. Id. at 6; see also VIGNETTES, supra note 60, at 1 (recommending both a new research
program to support ecosystem management and a shift in NPS professional staffing from generalists to specialists); THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 107 (recommending more research to aid
management);.
166. Florio, supra note 104, at 379-80.
167. See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT 53 (1993).
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of natural processes.""'
Statutory detail frustrates more than just the ability to adapt and apply
technical expertise to changing circumstances and new information with respect to individual units. It also frustrates the ability of the Service to set priorities for comprehensive planning. The VAIL AGENDA cited "new, costly, and
sometimes ill-conceived responsibilities" that thwart the Service's ability to set
funding priorities." Austere budgets force the agency to direct its precious
resources toward politically mandated activities rather than toward activities
that are most rational from a scientific management perspective. If the Service
is to shift from its traditional, reactive role as a custodian without a comprehensive agenda, it must have broad flexibility to set its own priorities. 70
Statutory constraints limit the Service's capability to realize the potential of
the GMP process to set priorities for individual park units.
Even more deleterious is the manner in which Congress frustrates the
ability of the Service to manage its units together in an integrated system.'
Commentators have criticized congressional management in the pollution control area, where statutory detail thwarts comprehensive planning that would
focus EPA regulation in areas where the greatest amount of environmental
benefits result per unit of agency effort (or national expense).'72 The relatively slight benefit of clarifying management objectives on the scale of a park
unit that comes from detailed establishment legislation counterbalances a fundamental problem with the national park system. The combination of a vague
Organic Act mandate coupled with the bewildering assortment of unit categories makes coordinated system management a Herculean task. Like a rotten
roof riddled with leaks, the current framework cries out for replacement. Although one can applaud Congress's actions to patch individual holes through
establishment statutes, the overall effort ultimately is ill-suited to curing the
structural defect.
Over the past 75 years, a proliferation of land management categories
have accreted around the core national park and monument units of the national park system. The national park system now includes units designated as:
National Preserve: National preserves are areas having character-
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istics associated with national parks, but in which Congress has permitted continued public hunting, trapping, [and] oil/gas exploration
and extraction. Many existing national preserves, without sport hunting, would qualify for national park designation.
National Historic Site: Usually, a national historic site contains a
single historical feature that was directly associated with its subject.
Derived from the Historic Sites Act of 1935, a number of historic
sites were established by secretaries of the Interior, but most have
been authorized by acts of Congress.
National Historic Park: This designation generally applies to
historic parks that extend beyond single properties or buildings.
National Memorial: A national memorial is commemorative of a
historic person or episode; it need not occupy a site historically connected with its subject.
National Battlefield: This general title includes national battlefield, national battlefield park, national battlefield site, and national
military park. In 1958, an NPS committee recommended national
battlefield as the single title for all such park lands.
National Cemetery: There are presently 14 national cemeteries in
the National Park System, all of which are administered in conjunction with an associated unit and are not accounted for separately.
National Recreation Area: Twelve NRAs in the system are centered on large reservoirs and emphasize water-based recreation. Five
other NRAs are located near major population centers. Such urban
parks combine scarce open spaces with the preservation of significant
historic resources and important natural areas in locations that can
provide outdoor recreation for large numbers of people.
National Seashore: Ten national seashores have been established
on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts; some are developed and
some relatively primitive. Hunting is allowed at many of these sites.
National Lakeshore: National lakeshores, all on the Great Lakes,
closely parallel the seashores in character and use.
National River: There are several variations to this category:
national river and recreation area, national scenic river, wild river,
etc. The first was authorized in 1964 and others were established
following passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968.
National Parkway: The title parkway refers to a roadway and the
parkland paralleling the roadway. All were intended for scenic motoring along a protected corridor and often connect cultural sites.
National Trail: National scenic trails and national historic trails
are the titles given to these linear parklands (over 3,600 miles)
authorized under the National Trails System Act of 1968.
Other Designations: Some units of the National Park System bear
unique titles or combinations of titles, like the White House and
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Prince William Forest Park.17
The interrelationship between these categories, let alone between the units
themselves, is tenuous at best. The categories provide for such diverse purposes as corridor protection, historic preservation, urban access to recreation,
buffer zone maintenance (many national preserves serve this function), and
scenic motoring. No other public land system is fragmented into subeategories
to the extent of the national park system. The national forest system, managed
by the U.S. Forest Service, for instance, consists almost exclusively of national
forests managed under a mandate of multiple use and sustained yield of natural resources.' Furthermore, periodic national reports provide national strategic objectives for the national forest system.'" Individual forest plans each
contribute to the national objectives. 76 Congress has subjected few
individual national forests to site-specific mandates. Even the national
wilderness preservation system, where management is divided among the
several federal public land agencies (including the NPS) and where each unit
is established by statute, is unitary in its management nomenclature and
mandate for strict preservation.
Still, it is conceivable that the multiple categories of reservations in the
national park system could be managed as interrelated elements. Key to most
conceptions of a system is a unifying common plan or purpose. The Organic
Act mandate to conserve and provide for enjoyment serves as guidance for
permissible park uses but fails to articulate an answer to the systemic question:
what are parks for? Professor Sax's advocated purpose of parks to cultivate
our reflective or contemplative faculties is broad enough to unify both the
historical and the natural units.'" But, without that or some other, more exclusive objective to provide systemic guidance, it will continue to be impossible to make comprehensive, reasoned management and funding choices. Moreover, the absence of cohesion among the units invites even more congressional
tailoring of establishment statutes and "park-barrel"'"" additions that fall
short of national significance. Over time, the vicious cycle operates to create
more diffusion.

173. Designation of National Park System Units (visited Nov.
13,
1996)
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appears in DWIGHT F. RETE, OuR NATIONAL PARK SYsTEm

40-58 (1995).
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SECrION V: SYSTEMIC REFORM

The Steering Committee of the Vail Agenda despaired at structural reform. After politely characterizing the hodgepodge of units Congress has
placed in the national park system as encompassing a "markedly diffuse range
of public values," the group stated: "Effective management of such a diffuse
system requires the abandonment of any hope for a single, simple management
philosophy."'7 Of course, this is true if we seek to arrive at a systemic management philosophy by finding common objectives that suit the existing units
in the system. If, instead, we were to create a philosophy based on normative
principles of what we would wish a park system to accomplish for the nation,
then we could use the systemic philosophy as a basis for deciding which units
are suitable for park system management and which are better suited for other
management systems.
Some units might be transferred to the Bureau of Land Management or
the U.S. Forest Service for multiple use-sustained yield management.s Other units, primarily valuable as feeding, breeding, and resting refuges for particular animals might be transferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service.'' Lands
with wilderness character could be managed as wilderness within the park
system if they advanced the systemic goals; otherwise, wilderness lands could
be managed by any of the federal land management agencies. 2 Perhaps a
new recreation-oriented agency would need to be established to manage some
current park units whose characteristics would not contribute to systemic
3
8

goals.1

There are a number of possible systemic philosophies the nation could
adopt for the national park system. 4 Commentators have discussed systemic
park management goals based on an ethic of place,8 8 a biodiversity restoration-ecosystem maintenance goal,' 86 an educational purpose,8 7 a cultivation of the contemplative faculties,'
wilderness restoration, 8 9 and
179. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15. at 9. Dwight Rettie observed that "Iflor all of its
history, the national park system has been essentially an improvisation." RETrIE, supra note 173,
at 14.
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994) (creating the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, which established management scheme for the BLM); Id. §§ 528-531, 1600-1614
(creating the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, and National Forest Management Act of 1976, which established a
management scheme for the U.S. Forest Service).
181. Id. §§ 668dd-668ee (creating the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966,
which established a management scheme for the national wildlife refuge system).
182. Id. §§ 1131-1136 (creating the Wilderness Act of 1964, which established the scheme for
management of the national wilderness preservation system).
183. Robin Winks suggests that "[tlhe agency spends 90 percent of its budget servicing visitors (building roads and paving trails, for example) rather than protecting resources. This is the
wrong ratio." Robin W. Winks, National ParksAren't Disneylands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at
A19.
184. Dwight Rettie reviews many of the efforts to apply comprehensive blueprints for management of the national park system. RETTIE, supra note 173, at 16-37.
185. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 132-86 (1992).
186. See Dave Foreman, Wilderness: From Scenery to Nature, WILD EARTH, Winter 1995/96,
at 8; Keiter, supra note 2, at 75.
187. THE VAIL AGENDA, supra note 15, at 108-11.
188. SAX, supra note 177, at 80.
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maintenance of national symbols." Choosing among these goals will be important and will instigate a long-neglected national debate. However, choose
we must in order to realize the potential of the vast majority of national park
system lands which ought to be valued not simply for their individual attributes but also for their contribution toward a larger systemic goal.
Congress will need to amend the Organic Act to incorporate a comprehensive systemic goal and perhaps to create new agencies. Some commentators
call for a supplemental, recreation-oriented agency, 9" others for an independent park service.' The institutional structures must await the definition of
substantive goals.
Professor Wilkinson has coined the term "lords of yesterday" to describe
the "battery of nineteenth-century laws, policies, and ideas that arose under
wholly different social and economic conditions but that remain in effect due
to inertia, powerful lobbying forces, and lack of public awareness."' 93
Wilkinson has in mind laws, such as the prior appropriation doctrine allocating
water in western states'94 and the General Mining Law of 1872,' 95 that promote resource extraction and are rooted in the allocation of property rights. In
this respect, the 1916 Organic Act is not a "lord of yesterday" because it reflects twentieth-century ideas of public administration. Additionally, it contains
the seed of modem notions of sustainable conservation. Indeed, all of the
plausible goals for a systemic management philosophy implement some vision
of this sustainable mandate, conservation of the parks and only such use as to
leave them unimpaired for future generations.' Abolition of the sustainable,
conservation mandate would disconnect the national park system from its noble and innovative history and destroy the potential for further progress.
Nonetheless, the Organic Act's systemic management mandate, enacted
when only thirty-five composed the national park system 9 7 and clarified only
slightly in 80 years, begs for reform. But, we must learn the lessons of the
unfulfilled preservationist promise of the 1978 amendments to the Organic
Act. Actual park unit management will not automatically shift direction, like a
compass exposed to a new magnetic field, with the enactment of Organic Act
reform legislation. Before any changes can be felt on the ground, Congress
will have to lift the establishment legislation mandates that shatter the
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Service's vision and divert the Service's resources.
Once Congress enacts a modem, comprehensive mandate that not only
describes how park lands are to be managed but also sets out a purpose for the
system, then the task of sorting through existing and potential units for suitability in the system may begin. Organic Act reform, by itself, will not succeed in the face of Service management primarily driven by establishment
statutes. The 104th Congress acted prematurely in considering legislation to
create a commission to recommend termination or modification of existing
NPS management of park units.'98 However, reform of the national park system must ultimately examine the issue of whether park units themselves or
statutory details dilute and detract from integrated management to achieve
systemic goals. In the meantime, Congress should resist entangling the Service
in more statutory detail, which impedes progress toward better park administration.
CONCLUSION

In addition to the recommendations for systemic reform of the statutory
basis of national park system management, the lessons of this Article are twofold. First, establishment legislation plays a critical role in driving NPS management and deserves more attention from commentators. Drafting decisions
for establishment legislation are the most important choices that are made for
the national park system. Therefore, it is critical that legal commentators direct
their attention to Congress. A conceptual framework for statute drafting, provided by a systemic mandate, is likely to have a much more profound effect
than refined judicial doctrines. As a "white hat" agency, the Service has not
faced the intense scrutiny by environmental groups as have other public land
managers, especially the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, which operate massive commodity extraction programs for minerals,
timber, and range. Even where the Service has taken controversial steps,
potential plaintiffs rightly hesitate to litigate against an agency with an image
of purity that represents cherished American values. In those few instances of
litigation, judicial review of proprietary decisions generally, and national park
system management in particular, is exceedingly deferential to the agency. So,
courts play a relatively insignificant role in national park system management,
other than ensuring that the Service adhere to specific directives of Congress.
And, of course, those specific directives are found in the establishment legislation.
Second, the relative insularity of legal scholarship in the natural resource
management and pollution control fields obscures important connections. A
comparative examination of trends in statute-drafting reveals parallel developments in pollution control (widely noted) and national park system administration (not widely noted). Congress has assumed a more active role in both
areas of environmental law as it addresses second-generation problems where

198.

H.R. 260, 104th Cong., § 103 (1995).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

the stakes involved are greater (and the potential benefits relatively smaller)
than in earlier lawmaking. The literature studying the trend of more pollution
control statutory detail proves helpful in describing different types of
congressional mandates, in understanding the reasons for the trend, and also in
evaluating whether the trend is a constructive development for environmental
law. The consensus in the literature that Congress has gone too far in micromanaging the EPA offers applicable wisdom for criticizing the similar
behavior in park establishment legislation. More scholarship that applies lessons from the pollution control area to natural resources management'" and
vice versa2"u will strengthen the foundations of environmental law.

199. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
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WEST-NORTHWEST 193 (1996) (applying federalism lessons from pollution control law to natural
resource management).
200. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 26, at 439 (addressing biological resource protection
through the use of EPA authorities).

